

SECRET

SUBJECT: Utilization of Volunteers

1. A major aspect of the problem of increasing our national capability for limited warfare lies in a more effective utilization of "volunteers", foreign or American. Our enemies have exhibited a major capability in this respect, both by actual utilization as in Korea, or by threat as in Indonesia and the Mid-East.

2. This Agency does have and has utilized the capability for providing selected American and foreign volunteers for cold war contingencies. Illustrative of such utilization was the employment of

25X1C



SECRET

SECRET


3. The capability outlined in the preceding paragraph is certainly useful and helpful in terms of providing leadership and training cadres to guerrilla forces but is not adequate in those situations where our enemies provide support in large quantities. The group composed of representatives from the Department of Defense, Department of State, and CIA which I mentioned previously are presently studying ways and means for increasing our utilization of foreign manpower. Several of the courses of action which have been suggested are covert in nature and therefore the responsibility of CIA. The Agency is studying the advantages and disadvantages of these courses with a view to determining whether or not any of those proposed are feasible and would increase our capability. The group is concentrating on the development of overt courses of action to which CIA would give covert support as required. Because of the overt subject of these deliberations, (recommendations will be transmitted to Deputy Secretary of Defense Quarles) I will not comment further on the activities of this group, except to note that their considerations are in terms of sizeable foreign military elements, which would resign en masse from their current active duty status in the armed forces of a friendly country, and would

SECRET

be hired as volunteers by the entity or entities which we are supporting. Delicate political considerations would of necessity be involved. It must be anticipated that the costs involved will to a very large extent have to be borne by the United States.

4. With regard to the utilization of American personnel, we have wherever possible employed civilians, whose activities could be

25X1C



We are currently consulting with the Department of Defense in an effort to develop more simplified procedures for making military personnel available when required.

5. We have on several occasions in the past given serious and thoughtful consideration to the desirability of forming units similar to the American Volunteer Group established by General Chennault in

SECRET

China prior to World War II. A detailed study on this subject of International Volunteer Air Groups was considered by the OCB in April 1957 with a decision at that time that the proposal was not

25X1C



which has been effectively employed in situations where the enemy air was of a similar limited nature. Should a situation arise in which the hostile entity has had jet aircraft made available to them, it is our opinion that any counter measure, to be effective, would require the employment of an integrated unit capable of handling its own support and maintenance. The possibility of obtaining the volunteer services of a foreign unit of such capability is limited.

SECRET